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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: WHY DOES IT MATTER?	1
1. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?	3
ITS FUNDAMENTAL OBJECT—FINDING LEGISLATION’S LEGAL MEANING	3
“ART” OR “SCIENCE”? – NOT ALGORITHMS, TOOLS FOR ARRIVING AT PREFERRED ANSWERS	4
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: MAIN GUIDING FACTORS	6
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: SOURCES OF RELEVANT LAW AND PRACTICE	6
THE NEED FOR INTERPRETATION – ROUTINE AND DIFFICULT CASES	7
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: PRECEDENT	9
2. TEXT – WHAT TEXT IS RELEVANT, AND HOW IS TEXT RELEVANT, TO FINDING LEGAL MEANING?	11
ACCESS TO DIFFERENT KINDS OF LEGISLATION IN FORCE IN NEW ZEALAND	11
<i>Kinds of enactments</i>	11
ACCESS TO LEGISLATION: FINDING IT, MOVING WITHIN IT, AND UNDERSTANDING IT	11
JUDICIAL NOTICE, “OFFICIAL VERSIONS”, AND AUTHENTICITY OR ACCURACY PRESUMPTIONS	12
<i>Judicial notice</i>	12
<i>“Official versions”, and authenticity or accuracy presumptions</i>	12
<i>Printed and electronic official versions – “officialisation” of NZ legislation database</i>	12
<i>How to tell whether website versions have been officialised</i>	13
<i>Will printed official versions continue?</i>	13
SUBJECT AREAS, AND COMMON CATEGORIES AND DISTINCTIONS, IN LEGISLATION	13
<i>Subject areas</i>	13
<i>Common categories or distinctions</i>	14
KINDS OF STANDARD PROVISIONS (“LANDMARKS”), AND THEIR FUNCTIONS	15
DRAFTING STYLES AND INNOVATIONS – DO 2012 ACTS DIFFER FROM MUCH OLDER ACTS?	15
<i>Innovations in current legislative drafting practice</i>	15
<i>Demonstrable improvements and occasional problems</i>	17
<i>Newer is better, constant scrutiny, and an endless journey</i>	19
SUBSTANTIVE, TEMPORAL, OR OTHER APPLICATION (IS IT IN FORCE, VALID, AND RELEVANT?)	20
PLAIN, ORDINARY, OR NATURAL MEANING OF TEXT – WHEN READILY ASCERTAINABLE	21
<i>Meaning from text</i>	21
<i>Text may be the main factor</i>	21
WHEN TEXT’S MEANING ISN’T PLAIN – EXAMPLE 1: BROAD AND “MOBILE” EXPRESSIONS	22
<i>Using dictionaries to help identify and resolve verbal ambiguity in broad expressions</i>	22
<i>“Mobile expressions” whose meaning changes (as attitudes, values, or technology change)</i>	23
WHEN TEXT’S MEANING ISN’T PLAIN – EXAMPLE 2: DRAFTING ERRORS	24
<i>An exception to textualism – notional changes to text to rectify errors</i>	24
<i>Recent UK example of error-correction applying the Inco Europe test – OB v Director of SFO</i>	24
<i>Dramatic “corrective surgery”, but only if an error clearly exists</i>	25
3. PURPOSE – WHY IS PURPOSE A SECOND KEY DRIVER OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION?	27
INTRODUCTION	27
PURPOSE? OR INTENTION OF PARLIAMENT?	29
<i>Purposive interpretation helps defeat the tyranny of language</i>	29
BRIEF HISTORY OF PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION	30
<i>Purposive interpretation: a modern version of the mischief rule</i>	32
<i>Are some enactments not susceptible to a purposive interpretation?</i>	33
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF AN ENACTMENT?	35
PURPOSE BASED ON GOVERNMENT POLICY	36
WHY (BUT ALSO HOW) LEGISLATION DOES WHAT IT DOES	36
PURPOSE – WHERE IS IT AUTHORITATIVELY STATED?	39
BALANCE BETWEEN TEXT AND PURPOSE	39
PURPOSE OPERATES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OR UNITS OF INQUIRY WITHIN AN ACT	41
RELATIVE STRENGTHS OF DIFFERENT APPLICABLE PURPOSIVE DIRECTIONS	42
APPARENT MEANINGS OF THE TEXT SHOULD BE CROSS-CHECKED AGAINST PURPOSE	42

OVER-PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION	47
WHERE TEXT HAS WITHSTOOD ATTEMPTS TO READ IT (OVER) PURPOSIVELY	51
HOW PURPOSE CAN INFLUENCE THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TEXT	53
<i>Filling gaps</i>	53
COURTS MUST NOT USURP PARLIAMENT’S POLICY MAKING FUNCTION	56
WHEN WILL THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH NOT BE APPLIED?	57
4. CONTEXT – WHY AND HOW DOES CONTEXT AFFECT LEGISLATION’S PREFERRED MEANING?.....	59
INTRODUCTION	59
WHY CONTEXT ISN’T EVERYTHING, BUT IS MUCH MORE THAN NOTHING, TO INTERPRETATION	59
INTERNAL CONTEXT: SECTIONS, ASSOCIATED WORDS, LIMITED CLASSES	60
<i>Associated words rule (noscitur a sociis)</i>	60
<i>Limited class rule (ejusdem generis)</i>	61
THE ACT AS A WHOLE – ITS SCHEME – PARTS, SUBPARTS, GROUPING OF PROVISIONS.....	62
CROSS-REFERENCES TO PROVISIONS IN OTHER ENACTMENTS	68
INDICATIONS PROVIDED IN THE ENACTMENT	69
<i>Section headings</i>	69
EXTERNAL CONTEXT: GENERAL	69
<i>Caution needed</i>	71
<i>The facts of the case are critical</i>	72
OTHER CURRENT LAW	72
<i>Other Acts</i>	72
<i>Later Acts</i>	73
<i>Regulations</i>	75
<i>Treaties</i>	75
<i>Common law</i>	76
<i>Parliament taken to be aware of recent case law</i>	77
REPEALED ACTS AND REVOKED REGULATIONS.....	77
COMMON LAW THAT HAS BEEN REPLACED BY A STATUTE	79
SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND OTHER FACTORS	80
EVIDENCE ACT 2006, SS 128-129	81
LEGISLATIVE FACT EVIDENCE	82
INTERVENERS AND AMICI CURIAE	84
GOVERNMENT PRACTICE IN ADMINISTERING AN ACT AND INFORMATION BULLETINS.....	85
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY	87
<i>Reports of committees or commissions recommending the legislation</i>	87
<i>Cabinet papers</i>	88
<i>Explanatory note accompanying the introduction copy of the Bill</i>	89
<i>Attorney-General’s report under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Right Act 1990</i>	90
<i>Drafting history</i>	91
<i>Changes not made to a Bill</i>	92
<i>Select committee commentaries on bills</i>	92
<i>Submissions to a select committee</i>	93
<i>Departmental reports</i>	96
<i>Debates in Parliament during a Bill’s passage</i>	97
CONCLUSION ON USE OF EXTRINSIC MATERIALS	99
5. VALUES – WHY AND HOW DO BASIC PRINCIPLES OR VALUES AFFECT LEGAL MEANING?.....	101
BASIC PRINCIPLES – INTERPRETATIVE CHOICES SERVE ONE VALUE OVER ANOTHER	101
SOURCES OF VALUES – REGULATORY STANDARDS BILL ‘REGULATION PRINCIPLES’	101
<i>Values before and beyond the Bill of Rights</i>	101
<i>Regulatory Standards Bill and its “Principles of Responsible Regulation”</i>	101
<i>Current law presumption against expropriatory effect – Paki</i>	102
<i>Property being taken or impaired under clear legislation, to serve other basic values – Elliot</i>	103
OTHER COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES	104
<i>Access to justice – Heenan</i>	104
<i>Extraterritorial application – Poynter and Ludgater</i>	104
<i>Preventing wrongdoers profiting from their own wrongdoing – Welwyn Hatfield BC</i>	105
PRACTICALITY, COMMON SENSE, WORKABILITY, CONVENIENCE, OTHER CONSEQUENCES	106

<i>Proposed meaning is unacceptably impractical – Contract Pacific</i>	106
<i>Another unacceptable and unintended result – Service and Food Workers Union</i>	106
TREATY OF WAITANGI, AND NEW ZEALAND’S OTHER INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS	107
<i>Provisions referring to principles of, or otherwise taking account of, Treaty of Waitangi</i>	107
<i>Presumption of consistency with principles of Treaty of Waitangi</i>	107
<i>Examples where Treaty-compliant meaning preferred – Barton-Prescott and Faulkner</i>	107
<i>Effect on domestic law of other (human rights and other) international legal obligations</i>	108
<i>International legal obligations on matters beyond basic human rights – Harlen and Exide</i>	109
<i>International sale of goods, uniformity, and interpretation “autonomous” from domestic law</i>	110
NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 – (IN)CONSISTENCY WITH BASIC RIGHTS	111
<i>Reviews for rights-consistency of governmental or public acts, Bills, and laws</i>	111
INTERPRETATION (MEANING) REMEDIES, AND OTHER “REMEDIES”, FOR RIGHTS INCONSISTENCY	112
HOW TO TELL WHETHER AN ENACTMENT “CAN BE GIVEN” A RIGHTS-CONSISTENT MEANING	113
STRUCTURED OR UNITARY REASONING – IS THERE A ‘RIGHT WAY’ TO APPLY THE BILL OF RIGHTS?	114
CONSISTENCY NOT JUST IN MEANING, BUT ALSO IN APPLICATION	114
RIGHTS DEFINITION – IS THE RIGHT CONCERNED EVEN ENGAGED?	115
<i>Double jeopardy – s 26(2) – Gwaze</i>	115
<i>Right of person charged with an offence to appeal – s 25(h) – Paul</i>	116
<i>Right of person charged to trial by jury – s 24(e) – legislative changes</i>	116
<i>Unreasonable search or seizure – s 21 – Lorigan</i>	117
RIGHTS DEFINITION ALSO INVOLVES ‘FACTORING IN’ JUSTIFIED LIMITS ON AFFIRMED RIGHTS	118
HOW TO TELL WHETHER A LIMIT ON A RIGHT IS, UNDER S 5 OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, JUSTIFIED	119
<i>Proportionality – what is involved?</i>	119
<i>Example of reasoning – Wanganui District Council (Prohibition of Gang Insignia) Bill</i>	119
DIFFERENT KINDS OF INTERPRETATION (MEANING) ‘REMEDIES’	120
<i>Choosing between ‘available’ or ‘viable’ meanings of ambiguous words – Hansen</i>	120
<i>Requiring words to be given a strained meaning – Adoption Act case</i>	121
<i>Implying exceptions, or limits, to broadly-worded provisions – Chambers (‘Twitter joke trial’)</i>	121
<i>Implying exceptions, or limits, to broadly-worded provisions – Taylor</i>	122
<i>Ascertaining exact meaning of vague or broad terms or concepts – Moonen, Brooker, Morse</i>	123
<i>Ascertaining scope, and influencing (placing side-constraints on) use, of powers – Schubert</i>	124
WHEN ENACTMENTS CANNOT BE GIVEN RIGHTS-CONSISTENT MEANINGS – S 4	125
<i>Rights-inconsistent enactments override, as a last resort</i>	125
<i>Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (NZCA)</i>	125
<i>R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC)</i>	126
<i>Spark v R [2009] NZSC 130</i>	127
<i>Limits on the right to trial by jury (s 24(e)) – Porter – and limits on other rights</i>	127
<i>Rights-consistent enactments need not be narrow or have limited effect - Cropp</i>	128
EXPRESS RANKING, WAIVER, OR OVERRIDING PROVISIONS	129
6. ALL THE PIECES MATTER – A STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CHECKLIST	131
TEXT	132
PURPOSE	132
CONTEXT	133
VALUES	134
7. CROSSWORD PUZZLE — SOME KEY POINTS IN OUTLINE	136
APPENDIX ONE	139